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Objectives. This paper analyzes the relationship between Palestinian suicide bombings and
economic and political conditions from 1993 to 2001. Labor market conditions could aﬀect the
number of terror attacks because when the economy worsens, the opportunity cost of engaging
in suicide terrorism decreases. An alternative explanation is that suicide bombings are responses
to changes in the political environment. Methods. Count data regression models are employed
to explore the relative importance of economic and political factors in determining the frequency
of suicide bombings. Results. Economic conditions explain some of the occurrence of suicide
bombings from 1993 to 2001, and some political events are also strongly correlated with bomb-
ings. Conclusions. The results imply that the roots of suicide bombing may lie in the unfulﬁlled
economic promises of the Oslo peace process, but speciﬁc acts by Israelis are a proximite cause
of the attacks.I’m frustrated, and if I reach the point where I can no longer work and feed my children,
then maybe I will become a suicide bomber, too. Ahmed Shibon, Palestinian worker
from the West Bank [31]
1 Introduction
From 1993 to 2001 Palestinian terrorists killed hundreds of Israelis, with most of these deaths
coming at the hands of suicide bombers. Although suicide bombing was once a rare phenomenon,
it is now a primary issue in the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict. The primacy of suicide bombing is
shown through the recent attention given to Israel’s attempt to build a separation barrier between
Palestinian population centers and Israel: a move designed to enhance the security of Israelis,
but one which will have a signiﬁcant negative impact on the Palestinian economy and impede the
creation of a Palestinian state [4].
This paper examines the degree to which economic and political conditions motivate sui-
cide bombers. While the epigraph and popular perception indicate that economic factors play an
important role, the relationship between changes in labor market conditions and the occurrence of
suicide bombing has not been examined empirically. Important political events, on the other hand,
are often cited by the groups carrying out the attacks, saying that they are responses to Israeli
aggression.
The link between economic conditions and terrorism has received considerable attention
since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Many policymakers claim that poverty has fueled
terrorism and that reducing third world poverty could be an eﬀective anti-terrorism policy. For
example, President Bush at a March 2002 anti-poverty summit stated, “We ﬁght against poverty
because hope is an answer to terror.”[12] Bush’s statement represents a continuation of the opinion
of the Clinton administration. President Clinton, in an address promising more aid to the Palestini-
1ans, claimed that, “For too long, too many young people have turned to terrorism and old hatreds,
partly because they had nothing better to do.”[9] 1
With heightened attention from policymakers, the relationship between economics and
terrorism has also piqued the interest of economists.2 In a recent study, Krueger and Maleckova [23]
examine the relationship between political violence and poverty. Using data from several countries,
they ﬁnd that it is not the poor and uneducated that primarily support terrorism. Economic status,
especially in the form of educational status, is either positively related or not related to willingness
to support or engage in political violence. They ﬁnd that Hezbollah militants in Lebanon have
higher family incomes and higher education levels than the rest of the population. They also
report ﬁndings from Palestinian opinion polls that show that support for Palestinian terrorism is
not aﬀected by education level.
A related paper by Berrebi [7] examines the educational and economic status of Palestinian
suicide bombers. His ﬁndings are that, similar to Krueger and Maleckova, there is no evidence to
show that suicide bombers are poor or uneducated. In fact, Berrebi ﬁnds that these bombers are
more educated and wealthier than the rest of the Palestinian population. Thus, when looking at
individuals, there is no evidence that those who are relatively deprived are more likely to engage
in terrorism.
But despite the lack of a cross-sectional correlation between poverty and terrorism, aggre-
gate economic conditions still may be correlated with the timing of Palestinian suicide bombings.
While the proclivity to engage in suicide terrorism may be independent of (or even positively cor-
related with) educational status or family wealth, changes in the economic environment may still
1Other editorial writers and policymakers have claimed that providing more foreign aid may help deter would be
terrorists. (See, for example, Sokolsky and McMillan [28] and Tyson[29]).
2Given that many of the groups carrying out the attacks have a religious basis, another related literature involves
the economics of religious organizations. In a recent paper related to the topic presented here, Berman [5] presents
a theoretical model that helps explain behavior by radical religious groups using a rational choice framework.
2cause more people to become willing to engage in terrorism.
Despite theoretical support for the hypothesized relationship between terrorism and eco-
nomic conditions, groups carrying out the attacks (primarily Hamas and Islamic Jihad) dispute any
such relationship. Instead, these groups depict the bombers as dedicated soldiers, simply carrying
out military attacks [1], [19]. As such, these acts are claimed to be no diﬀerent in their motivation
than the shootings, kidnappings, and other attacks that predated the rise in suicide bombing.3
This paper assesses the degree to which labor market conditions and political conditions
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) aﬀect the frequency of attacks. I present results from
several count data models that regress the number of suicide bombings originating from diﬀerent
regions on those regions’ labor market conditions and dummy variables for political events. The
results from these models imply that poor labor market conditions are correlated with increases in
suicide bombing, but that speciﬁc political events are also important.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some features of Palestinian
suicide bombings, and section 3 describes the Palestinian economy and labor market. Section 4
presents a theoretical framework based upon occupational choice. This framework is given an
empirical speciﬁcation in section 5, which is estimated in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Palestinian Suicide Bombings and Political Events
Figure 1 depicts the quarterly frequency of suicide bombing and all terrorist attacks, where the
y-axis represents the number of attacks per quarter. Data on terrorist attacks, including suicide
bombings, are from the International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism [11] and have been
veriﬁed by checking information from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs [24] and news accounts
3A recent paper by Berman and Laitin [6] examines what forces lead groups to be more likely to use suicide
attacks rather than more conventional attacks. The authors ﬁnd that suicide attacks are distinguished by the types
of targets chosen.
3in The Jerusalem Post and The New York Times. The ﬁrst characteristic to note is that suicide
bombings by Palestinians are a relatively new phenomenon. Although terrorist attacks by Pales-
tinians against Israelis in the forms of shootings, stabbings, hijacking and hostage taking have
occurred since the 1960s, the ﬁrst suicide bombing was not until 1993.
A second characteristic to note is that bombings often coincided with the timing of im-
portant events in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. For example, in 1995 the frequency of the
bombings increased in the early summer as the deadline approached for the agreement to redeploy
from West Bank cities (the “Oslo II” agreement). In August the bombing abruptly ended and
ceased for over six months as the Palestinian Authority leader, Yasser Arafat, pressured Hamas
and Islamic Jihad to halt bombing during the Oslo II redeployment [14].
A third characteristic is that these bombings are often in response to acts of violence by
Israelis. For example, consider two events that preceded waves of bombings. The ﬁrst is the Ibrahimi
mosque massacre. In February 1994 the Israeli-American Baruch Goldstein killed 30 Palestinian
worshippers in the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron. After the end of the 40 day mourning period,
there were two intense bombings against Israelis targets. A second spate of bombings occurred in
February and March of 1996. As mentioned above, in 1995 before and during the withdrawal of
Israeli troops from six West Bank towns, Hamas and Islamic Jihad suspended their attacks. On
January 5, 1996, Israeli agents assassinated Yahya Ayyash, who was the mastermind behind most
of the suicide bombings in 1994 and 1995, by detonating a bomb in his cellular phone [14]. Six
weeks after Ayyash’s death, Hamas and Islamic Jihad retaliated with a series of bombings that
killed over 60 Israelis in a matter of days.
A fourth characteristic of the bombings is that bombings have become much more frequent
since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa intifada (uprising) in September 2000.4 Before this period only
4More recently, the frequency of suicide bombing has slowed again. Only eight suicide bombings occurred in 2004,
less than half of the number in the ﬁrst three months of 2002.
4one quarter saw more than three suicide bombings, but each quarter of 2001 had four or more
bombings. During the intifada the groups behind the bombings and the characteristics of the
bombers also changed.5 Despite the increase in bombing activity during the Al-Aqsa intifada, it
should also be noted that these bombings did not begin until the end of October, and they did not
occur with much frequency until the beginning of 2001.
3 The Palestinian Economy from 1993 to 2001
While consistent measures of the performance of the Palestinian economy are not available from
the beginning of the 1990s, some trends are clear. The Palestinian economy stagnated from 1993
to 1999, and after the advent of the al-Aqsa intifada, the situation deteriorated rapidly. The level
of poverty in the WBGS has risen since 1993 primarily because of a weak and volatile labor market
that resulted from repeated border closures, low investment, and a lack of private sector expansion.
Closures of the border between the WBGS and Israel, combined with a strict permit policy for
Palestinians working in Israel when the border was open, has caused billions of dollars of losses
to the Palestinian economy since 1993.6 As more Palestinians were allowed to work in Israel from
1997 to mid 2000, the Palestinian economy improved, but without a ﬁnal peace agreement, private
investment was still not forthcoming. With the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada in September
2000, income has fallen even further. The World Bank [4] estimates that between September 2000
and December 2002, per capita income in WBGS fell by 40 percent.7
The health of the Palestinian labor market can be measured directly by examining the
5Recent bombers have included women, secular Palestinians, married men and older men while earlier bombers
were typically young, religious and unmarried men.
6While there has been substantial foreign aid ﬂowing into the Palestinian economy to mitigate the negative eﬀects
of the closure, including as much as one billion dollars in 2003, this aid has not fully mitigated the eﬀects of closures.
Furthermore, much of the aid has been diverted from development projects that would have supported infrastructure
construction, but now has to be spent on revenue support for the Palestinian Authority and make-work support
programs. [4]
7See UNSCO [26] for various reports on the economic eﬀects of the al-Aqsa intifada.
5changes in the unemployment rate and average wages. Figure 2 plots the unemployment rate for
15 to 24 year old men in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1993 to 2001. These ﬁgures, along
with wage data, come from two sources: the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) and the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). ICBS labor-force data are available from 1981 to
1995.8 After the second quarter of 1995, data collection was transferred to the PCBS.9 From 1993
to 1995 there was relatively little variation in the unemployment rate, but from 1995 to 1998 the
unemployment rate was both high and highly variable. This volatility arose from the imposition
of closure of Palestinian territories, usually in response to a terrorist attack. Because as much as
one third of the Palestinian labor force was employed in Israel during this period, closures had
a dramatic eﬀect on the labor market outcomes of Palestinians. From 1998 through late 2000,
unemployment decreased as more Palestinians were allowed to reach jobs in Israel. While most
of the analysis will use the micro data from the PCBS, I include 1993 to 1995 since one of the
speciﬁcations will use the longer trend, from 1993 to 2001.
Figure 3 plots real median daily wages in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1993 to
2001, showing some wage growth during this time, especially from 1998 to 2000. These data
show considerably less volatility than the unemployment ﬁgures partly because average wages are
calculated only for those who work in the WBGS. Including Palestinians who work in Israel would
raise the median wage (wages in Israel for Palestinians are generally seventy percent higher than
WBGS wages) and make these wage ﬁgures more variable. While wages grew from 1996 to 2000,
wages began to decline after the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000. While the
8Note that much of the analysis in this paper uses a shorter time frame, from 1995 to 2001. The exclusion of
the earlier years is necessitated by conducting the analysis at the sub district level and sub district variables are not
available for the 1993-1995 ICBS data.
9The ICBS data were collected by Palestinian enumerators in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the ICBS as part of
the Territories Labor Force Survey (TLFS). Each quarterly cross-section contains approximately 10,000 observations
and each household is surveyed for two consecutive quarters, not surveyed for two quarters, and surveyed again for
two quarters. For Gaza, the last available data from the TLFS is for the ﬁrst quarter 1994 and the last for the West
Bank is the second quarter 1995. The survey methodology for the Palestinian labor force survey is similar to that of
the Israeli survey.
6increase in wages and decrease in unemployment just before the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada may
seem to be evidence against the relationship between political violence and economic conditions, it
should be noted that there was a similar improvement in labor market conditions leading up the
1987-1992 intifada. As noted in Angrist [3], however, the improvement in economic conditions was
not uniform and those with more education saw their relative wages fall during this time.
4 Theoretical Considerations
Previous economic research explores the link between labor market conditions and suicide.10 The
economic approach to the study of suicide is based on the opportunity cost of taking one’s life, with
Hamermesh and Soss [18] providing a theoretical framework based upon the frustration-aggression
hypothesis of Henry and Short [21]. According to this framework, when an individual’s perception
of the net beneﬁt (monetary and psychological) of continuing to live falls below an idiosyncratic
threshold, that person decides to commit suicide. Thus, when aggregate economic conditions
worsen, more individuals fall below their personal threshold and suicide rates increase.11 More
recent empirical research shows that economic factors are helpful in explaining variations in suicide
rates over time, across countries, and across age groups (see Huang [22] and Viren [30]).
Another theoretical framework that ties economic conditions to suicide rates is Easterlin’s
[10] relative-income hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, large birth cohorts will have relatively
10A related literature focuses on the relationship between labor market conditions and violent crime rates. The
theoretical framework used in Grogger [15] and others describes time allocation between two sectors: crime and
employment. Grogger [15] and Richard Freeman and William M. Rodgers III [13], among many, ﬁnd that variation
in crime rates is partially explained by changes in labor market opportunities of young men.
11The degree to which this phenomenon should be thought of as suicide at all raises the issue of the overall Pales-
tinian suicide rate. Not only should suicide bombing increase during periods of low wages and high unemployment,
but all forms of youth suicide should increase. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics does not systematically
collect suicide data. However, anecdotal evidence (Amr [2] and Abdulhadi [17]) suggests that suicide rates increased
in 1997, even as tensions between Israelis and Palestinians were at a lull. In fact, one observer notes, “during the
...intifada ...youths that w anted to kill themselves w ould join in clashes against the Israelis. Now there are no
soldiers, so they revert to pills and rat poison.”[2] Similarly, Hamas has decried some unsanctioned attacks by the
very young as being so hopeless, that they amounted to little more than suicide [27]. It is also worth noting than
youth suicide rates by young Jewish Israeli men increased from 1984 to 1995, especially for those in the military [32].
7worse economic outcomes, compared to their parents’ relatively small birth cohorts. Members of
large cohorts will not be able to attain the high standard of living of their parents, resulting in
frustration and high suicide rates.
An important theoretical implication of both of these streams of literature is that cross-
sectional studies comparing wealth or education of terrorists to the population as a whole is not a
suﬃcient means by which to test the eﬀects of economic conditions on suicide terrorism. Instead,
if we take the theoretical literature seriously, one should not be surprised by ﬁndings like those
in Krueger and Maleckova [23] and Berrebi [7]: there is no reason to expect that poor people are
more likely to become frustrated to the point of violence than are wealthier people. Those who
feel the frustration most acutely from a change in their economic conditions may be high status
according to their wealth or education level. However, so long as aggregate economic conditions
are positively correlated with the outcomes of the groups most likely to become frustrated, then
aggregate conditions should aﬀect the number of suicide bombings.
Following the literature on the economics of suicide, one can use an opportunity cost
argument to explain the link between changes in labor market conditions and the frequency of
suicide bombings. Suppose there are two ways a Palestinian youth can spend his time: seeking
out job opportunities in the labor market or seeking “opportunities” in the suicide bombing sector.
When labor demand shifts in the market sector, labor supply to the bombing sector changes. If
labor demand increases in the market sector, wages increase and unemployment decreases, resulting
in fewer youths being willing to become suicide bombers. When labor demand falls, wages fall and
unemployment rises. Since the opportunity cost of being a bomber is now lower, more young people
will seek out opportunities in the bombing sector. Thus, weak labor market conditions increase the
supply of bombers and the number of suicide bombings.12
12One can consider that there are at least two types of labor used in suicide bombings: bombers and “handlers,”
who recruit and train the bombers. As the opportunities in the market sector decrease, more workers are willing to
8An additional cost that can aﬀect the number of suicide bombings is the intensity of Israeli
(and Palestinian) anti-terrorism eﬀorts. When these eﬀorts are more intense, as they are during a
closure, the cost of carrying out a bombing will increase, leading to fewer bombings. The decline
in suicide bombings since 2002 may reﬂect this increase in costs, as parts of the barrier separating
the West Bank from Israel were completed in 2003 and 2004 [16].
While closures should increase the costs of engaging in terrorism, some political events
will increase the demand for bombers. If the gains to the organizations’ prestige is greater during
certain times, then demand for bombers will increase.
5 Empirical Model
This section develops an empirical model based upon the above theoretical framework. The basic
model estimates the eﬀect of labor market conditions and political events on the frequency of suicide
bombing in Israel. The dependent variable in this model is the number of suicide bombings per
quarter by sub district, implying that a count data model will be appropriate.13
The linear version of the estimating equation is
Bombingjt = α + β1Wage jt + β2Unemjt + γEventjt +  jt. (1)
Bombingjt is the number of suicide bombings originating from sub district j in period t.
Wage jt represents the median daily wage (in New Israeli Shekels) in sub district j at time t and
Unemjt is the unemployment rate for 15 to 24 year old men in sub district j at time t. Eventjt is
become handlers. As the supply of handlers increases, terrorist organizations can either select more qualiﬁed handlers
or pay them less. This will also lead to more suicide bombings.
13Sub districts are based upon governates, areas around and including population centers, such as large towns or
cities. Eleven sub districts are denoted in this analysis. In the West Bank they are Jenin; Tulkaram and Qalqilya;
Nablus; Hebron; Ramallah; Bethlehem and Jericho; and Jerusalem. The Gaza Strip is divided into four sub districts:
North Gaza; Gaza City; Middle Gaza; and South Gaza.
9an indicator of the occurrence of an important political event, such as the Ayyash assassination or
the signing of the Oslo II agreement.  jt is the error term. The predicted sign for β1 is negative,
and the predicted signs on β2 and γ are positive.
Because the dependent variable (bombings per quarter) consists of non-negative integers,
a count-data model is appropriate. Every quarter, each individual makes the decision whether or
not to become a suicide bomber and the outcome of all those individual decisions determines the
distribution of the total number of suicide bombings in the quarter. The standard treatment for
a “rare event” such as suicide bombing is the Poisson regression model, but there are potential
estimation issues that need to be examined further.
Two estimation issues immediately arise when estimating the current model with a Poisson
regression. The ﬁrst is that the Poisson distribution assumes that there is a single parameter µ that
is both the mean and variance of the distribution. Most data, however, violate this assumption, with
the variance substantially larger than the mean. This characteristic is known as “overdispersion,”
and as seen in Table 1, the dependent variable used here (suicide bombings) is likely to have
overdispersion, and it is treated by using a negative binomial model in place of the Poisson.14
A second issue that arises concerns unobserved heterogeneity between sub districts. The
unit of observation is the time period-sub district. For each quarter, there is are eleven observations,
one from each sub district (seven from the West Bank and four from the Gaza Strip). If there is
unobserved heterogeneity between the sub districts that causes error terms within a sub district
to be correlated, then not taking into account these unobserved factors will lead to inconsistent
estimates. For example, the greater ease of entry into Israel from the Tulkaram area may cause more
bombers to originate from that sub district. In order to account for this unobserved heterogeneity,
14While technically overdispersion refers to the relationship between the conditional mean and the conditional
variance, simply comparing the sample mean and the sample variance is a convenient way of measuring the potential
for overdispersion (Cameron and Trivedi [8], p. 77). Since the variance of suicide bombing is three times its mean,
overdispersion is highly likely in this case.
10this paper uses a ﬁxed-eﬀects negative binomial model as suggested by Hausman, Hall and Griliches
[20].
Two additional potential problems need to be addressed. The small number of cross
sectional units imply that the panel nature of the data may still suﬀer from serial correlation.
However, using a test for serial correlation as outlined on page 275-276 of Wooldridge [33], I ﬁnd no
evidence of serial correlation in these data. A ﬁnal issue that needs to be addressed is the possibility
of reverse causality between suicide bombings and economic conditions. However, using standard
tests for endogeneity using candidate instruments did not reveal residual correlation between the
errors and the lagged economic variables. Furthermore, tests for granger causality imply that
economic conditions granger-cause suicide bombings, but suicide bombings do not granger-cause
economic conditions.
6R e s u l t s
Table 2 presents results from a ﬁxed-eﬀects negative binomial regression model.15 Each speciﬁcation
regresses the number of suicide bombings on the median lagged wage for all men, the lagged
unemployment rate for 15-24 year old men. In addition to the economic variables, I include a dummy
variable for the quarter following the assassination of Yahya Ayyash (“ayyash”). Some models also
include a dummy variable for quarters when peace agreements were signed (“agreement”), a dummy
variable representing Palestinian control of a region (1=Palestinian control, 0= Israeli control)16
and the lagged value of the closure index.17 This index is the proportion of days under closure out
15A Poisson speciﬁcation was also estimated, but due to ﬁnding evidence of overdispersion, negative binomial
models are preferred.
16This is an imprecise measure of Palestinian control since the unit of analysis is the sub district. Within each sub
district there were areas that were both under direct Palestinian Authority military control (usually the urban areas)
and areas under Israeli military control (usually smaller villages in the countryside).
17I use lagged rather than current labor market variables due to potential endogeneity problems. Since bombings
often result in closures, and closures lead to higher unemployment and lower wages, current bombings will cause
changes in current labor market conditions. On the other hand, while last quarter’s poor economic conditions
11of total days in the period. The closure data are from the Palestinian Ministry of Labour [25] and
United Nations reports on the closure [26]. These sources were checked for accuracy with various
newspaper accounts, primarily Palestine Report and The Jerusalem Post.
The two main economic variables of interest in Table 2 are the lagged unemployment rate
and the lagged wage rate. In the second and fourth speciﬁcation (columns 1 and 4), lower wages
are correlated with a higher incidence of suicide bombings, and the estimated eﬀect is signiﬁcant
at the ten percent level. However, this ﬁnding is not robust across speciﬁcations.18 Ah i g h e r
unemployment rate, on the other hand, has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of
suicide bombings in all speciﬁcations. The statistical signiﬁcance of the unemployment coeﬃcient
varies substantially, but has a p-value less than .10 in all of the models. The speciﬁcations where
the signiﬁcance of this coeﬃcient declines are those where lagged values of the closure index are
included in the model, as closures and unemployment are highly correlated.
In addition to labor market conditions, political events inﬂuence the number of suicide
bombings. The dummy variables for the quarter of the assassination of Yahya Ayyash is consis-
tently positive and statistically signiﬁcant. However, other political variables are not statistically
signiﬁcant. The frequency of bombings is not aﬀected by whether or not a political agreement is
about to be signed, whether or not the Likud party is in power in Israel and whether or not there
has been an election called in Israel. Additionally, PNA control of an area does not inﬂuence the
frequency of bombings coming from that district.
While political events may cause suicide bombings to become more beneﬁcial to terrorist
groups, closures should make the bombings more costly. During a closure, terrorist groups must
could aﬀect bombings in the current quarter, causality does not run the other way. I tested for endogeneity of lagged
economic variables and found them to be exogenous. Additionally, granger causality tests showed that unemployment
granger-cause suicide bombings but that suicide bombings do not granger-cause unemployment.
18I also ran all of the models excluding wages from the regression. The other estimated coeﬃcients are not sensitive
to the inclusion of wages in the model.
12make additional eﬀorts to avoid check-points, and heightened security increases the probability of
apprehension. Although Israel’s closures of the Palestinian territories are an eﬀort to deter suicide
bombings, the results in Table 2 imply that they are ineﬀective: The estimated coeﬃcient on
closures in Column 3 and Column 5 are positive and signiﬁcant.19
It also is worth noting whether or not suicide bombings have diﬀerent correlates than other
types of terrorist attacks.20 Table 3 reports regression results from models with three diﬀerent
dependent variables: suicide bombings, all attacks, and all bombings.21
The top panel contains results from a model that is similar to those presented in Table
2. The diﬀerence between these estimates and the earlier ones are that this model uses data that
are aggregated at the regional level (Gaza and West Bank) rather than the sub district level and
use the longer time series, from 1993 to 2001. 22 Because there are fewer cross-sectional units,
the number of observations in these models is only 65, compared to 241 for the regressions from
Table 2. Because of the smaller number of observations, the ﬁndings are more sensitive to model
speciﬁcation, especially the ﬁndings on unemployment and wages.
The middle panel reports results from a model with all attacks (stabbings, shootings, etc.)
as the dependent variable. In comparing results from the top and middle panels, note that while
suicide bombings are inﬂuenced by labor market conditions, this is not true of terrorist attacks
in general. Neither wages or the unemployment rate has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
frequency of all terror attacks. Moreover, although suicide bombings account for well over half of
19Since closures were part of a regime of heightened security in general, if one were able to measure the number of
suicide bombings attempted, the positive correlation between bombing and closures would be even stronger.
20Recent work by Berman and Laitin [6] suggests that suicide terrorism is more likely to occur when targets are
“hard”– when the probability of apprehension after an attack is very high. The current paper does not look at
the targets, but notes whether shootings, stabbings and other bombings are correlated with the same political and
economic conditions that are correlated with suicide attacks.
21The attacks include, but are not limited to, stabbings, shootings, kidnappings, and other types of bombings. See
the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism [11] for a complete list of types of attacks included. Note
from Table 1 that suicide bombings are less than one third of all attacks from 1993-2001.
22While these data are more likely to suﬀer from problems of serial correlation and endogeneity due to the lessened
cross-sectional variation, they can still be illustrative for comparing models with diﬀerent dependent variables.
13all bombings during this period, the estimated coeﬃcients on wages and unemployment are not
signiﬁcant when the dependent variable is all bombings (bottom panel).
Table 3 also reports the estimated coeﬃcients on political measures, including a dummy
variable for the quarter of the Hebron mosque massacre. In the top panel (suicide bombings)
this estimated coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant in all four model speciﬁcations (columns i-iv),
similar to the ﬁndings on the “ayyash” dummy from Table 2. In the middle panel (all attacks) the
estimated coeﬃcient is, likewise, positive in all four speciﬁcations. Yet only in the ﬁrst two columns
is the estimated eﬀect even marginally signiﬁcant (p-value<.20). When the dependent variable is
all bombings (bottom panel), the estimated eﬀect of the hebron dummy is similar to that found in
the top panel.
While an impending peace agreement is correlated with an increase in the frequency of
suicide bombings according to this model, there is no evidence that it increases the overall number
of attacks. The estimated coeﬃcient on the agreement dummy is insigniﬁcant in all model spec-
iﬁcations in the middle panel. This is in sharp contrast to the positive and at least marginally
signiﬁcant eﬀect that it has in the suicide bombings model. In the bottom panel, one can see that
when the dependent variable is the total number of bombings, the coeﬃcient on the agreement
dummy again becomes positive and signiﬁcant.23
7 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper examines the possibility that changes in the frequency of Palestinian suicide bombings
are related to labor market conditions. Alternatively, these attacks may be responses to political
events. Using count-data models of suicide bombings, this paper ﬁnds that increased unemployment
23All of the models in tables 2 and 3 were also estimated with other labor market measures including varying
lagged values of wages and unemployment rates and moving averages of varying lengths. None of these estimations
produced results qualitatively diﬀerent than those found in tables 2 and 3.
14is correlated with more suicide bombings and that political events also appear to be important.
While terror groups claim that the political motivation for suicide bombings is indistin-
guishable from other terror attacks, this claim is not supported. Although poor economic conditions
are correlated with increased suicide bombings, economic conditions do not inﬂuence the overall
number of terror attacks.
Ultimately, in this paper I hope to shed some light on the issue of whether policies intended
to improve the economic conditions of Palestinians will decrease their willingness to engage in suicide
attacks. The results in this paper imply that economic conditions play a role in determining the
frequency of suicide bombings. Therefore, economic policies targeting short-run unemployment
alleviation and long-run growth could be eﬀective in decreasing suicide terrorism. However, a poor
economy is only one of many factors that motivate suicide bombings.
What may be most important to understand is the frustration level of Palestinian youth.
They, unlike their parents, have been promised peace and prosperity by the Oslo Accords, and
when these beneﬁts failed to appear, their frustration soared. While aid for development is still
important and may ultimately decrease the gap between aspirations and reality, policymakers must
be careful to not promise too much.
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18Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for key variables
West Bank Gaza
Suicide bombings by sub district 0.180 0.121
(1995-2001) (0.546) (0.328)
Suicide bombings by region 1.11 0.556
(1.98) (0.939)










Standard deviations are in parentheses. All means and standard deviations are for the years 1993-
2001, except for the suicide bombings by sub district. These data are conﬁned to the later years
because sub district information is not available for the last three years of ICBS data collection,
1993-1995.
19Table 2: Fixed-Eﬀects Negative Binomial Estimates of Suicide Bombings Model
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
lunem 9.160 9.674 5.099 9.481 5.097
(2.123)*** (2.227)*** (2.550)** (2.198)*** (2.766)*
lwage -0.055 -0.058 -0.023 -0.064 -0.004
(0.035) (0.035)* (0.039) (0.035)* (0.045)
ayyash 1.511 1.612 1.546 2.474 2.969
(0.628)** (0.642)** (0.635)** (1.089)** (1.466)**










Constant 1.333 1.216 -0.935 0.786 -3.422
(2.346) (2.324) (2.507) (2.387) (3.141)
Observations 241 241 241 241 241
N u m b e r o f s u b d i s 2 1 11 11 11 11 1
Wald 33.58 33.02 42.56 33.96 41.13
P>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of suicide bombings from a subdistrict
(Jenin, North Gaza, etc.) in a quarter. The regressors include the lagged unemployment rate for 15-24 year old men,
lagged median daily wage rate for all men, dummy variables for a quarter that includes 40 days past the assassination
of Yahya Ayyash. Models (ii)-(v) also include a dummy variable for quarters when an major peace agreement was
signed (fall 1995, spring 1997); model (iii) includes a one quarter lagged measure of the intensity of closure; and
models (iv) and (v) include a dummy variable representing Palestinian control of a region (1=Palestinian control,
0= Israeli control) and model (v) includes indicators for whether or not the conservative likud party is in power in
Israel and whether or not there is an Israeli election imminent. *,**, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1
percent level, resepectively.
20Table 3: Fixed-Eﬀects Negative Binomial Estimates of Models of Suicide Bombings, All Terror
Attacks and All Bombings
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Dependent Var=
Suicide Bombings
lwage -0.098 -0.063 -0.032 -0.002
(0.058)* (0.061) (0.063) (0.066)
lunem 4.66 5.36 2.50 7.11
(2.35)** (2.45)** (3.08) (2.77)***
hebron 2.94 3.53 2.76 2.39
(0.937)*** (1.01)*** (1.09*** (1.03)**




lwage -0.012 -0.009 0.005 0.039
(0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.043)
lunem -0.534 -0.473 -2.20 2.95
(1.67) (1.67) (1.80) (1.96)
hebron 1.078 1.13 0.543 0.896
(0.073) (0.734) (0.719) (0.732)




lwage -0.100 -0.072 -0.039 -0.034
(0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.063)
lunem -0.309 0.068 -1.97 1.05
(2.09) (2.12) (2.61) (2.26)
hebron 2.02 2.49 1.77 2.11
(0.900)** (0.95)*** (1.02)* (0.943)**
agreement 1.70 1.34 1.38
(0.724)** (0.756)* (0.725)*
Standard errors are in parentheses. This table presents results from a conditional ﬁxed eﬀects negative binomial
model of the number of terrorist attacks on lagged unemployment rate for 15-24 year old men, lagged median daily
wage rate for all men, dummy variables for a quarter that includes 40 days past the two major events (massacre
at the Hebron mosque and the assassination of Yahya Ayyash), and three quarter dummies. Models (ii)-(iv) also
include a dummy variable for quarters when an major peace agreement was signed (fall 1993, fall 1995, spring 1997);
model (iii) includes a one quarter lagged measure of the intensity of closure; and model (iv) includes a dummy
variable representing Palestinian control of a region (1=Palestinian control, 0= Israeli control).*,**, and *** indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, resepectively.
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